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17 The Real Difficulty with Burley's Realistic Semantics MICHAEL J. FITZGERALD The supposition of common terms has always been problematic for medieval semantic theory, whether one focuses on the theory of proper supposition or the theory of the modes of common personal sup- position. In a recent short paper, "A Defense of a Burlean Dilemma," 1 P. V. Spade has sharply focused on a difficulty Spade sees with com- mon terms in Burlean semantic theory. Originally Spade seemed to think that Burley's epistemological views were relevant to his semantic treatment of common terms, and created a dilemma with respect to the reconciliation of his semantic theory with his epistemological theory.2 Now Spade sees Burley's epistemological views as irrelevant to the evaluation of Burley's semantic theory of the proper supposition of common terms. The issue as Spade now sees it is: 1) Common terms, for Burley, only signify species or common natures, and not individuals. 2) Only when common terms simply supposit do they supposit for what they signify, i.e. (pro suo significato). 3) Terms only signify the entities they make us think of. 4) Therefore, only when common terms simply supposit for com- mon natures can we think
Vivarium – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 1990
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