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Forms of Individuals in Plotinus: A Re-Examination

Forms of Individuals in Plotinus: A Re-Examination Forms of Individuals in Plotinus: A Re-Examination PAUL KALLIGAS For most modern readers of Plato the very idea of Forms of individuals would appear as being contradictory and incomprehensible. A Platonic Form is normally thought of as something represented by a term such as ÒLargenessÓ or ÒJusticeÓ or, perhaps, ÒFireÓ or ÒTreeÓ, and supposed to be in some way responsible for the presence of the corresponding gen- eral properties of being ÒlargeÓ or ÒjustÓ, Òa Ž reÓ or Òa treeÓ in individ- ual objects. It is considered as a basic aspect of both its ontological and its epistemological function that it provides a unitary and stable point of reference for all the various uses of these general terms and, therefore, a guarantee for their unambiguousness. Plato himself stresses this connec- tion between Forms and generality while formulating his famous ÒruleÓ for introducing them: We have been in the habit, if you remember, of positing a Form whenever we use the same name in many instances, one Form for each ÒmanyÓ. ( Rep . 596a, tr. A.D. Lindsay) Aristotle, when reviewing this ÒruleÓ in his Metaphysics , explicitly con- nects the Platonic Forms with his own universals ( kayñlou http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Phronesis Brill

Forms of Individuals in Plotinus: A Re-Examination

Kalligas, Paul
Phronesis , Volume 42 (2): 206 – Jan 1, 1997
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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1997 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0031-8868
eISSN
1568-5284
DOI
10.1163/156852897762700106
Publisher site
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Abstract

Forms of Individuals in Plotinus: A Re-Examination PAUL KALLIGAS For most modern readers of Plato the very idea of Forms of individuals would appear as being contradictory and incomprehensible. A Platonic Form is normally thought of as something represented by a term such as ÒLargenessÓ or ÒJusticeÓ or, perhaps, ÒFireÓ or ÒTreeÓ, and supposed to be in some way responsible for the presence of the corresponding gen- eral properties of being ÒlargeÓ or ÒjustÓ, Òa Ž reÓ or Òa treeÓ in individ- ual objects. It is considered as a basic aspect of both its ontological and its epistemological function that it provides a unitary and stable point of reference for all the various uses of these general terms and, therefore, a guarantee for their unambiguousness. Plato himself stresses this connec- tion between Forms and generality while formulating his famous ÒruleÓ for introducing them: We have been in the habit, if you remember, of positing a Form whenever we use the same name in many instances, one Form for each ÒmanyÓ. ( Rep . 596a, tr. A.D. Lindsay) Aristotle, when reviewing this ÒruleÓ in his Metaphysics , explicitly con- nects the Platonic Forms with his own universals ( kayñlou

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Phronesis – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 1997

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