Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Self-Predication in the Sophist

Self-Predication in the Sophist 55 Self-Predication in the Sophist ROBERT HEINAMAN A major problem in the interpretation of Plato's metaphysics is the question of whether he abandoned self-predication as a result of the Third Man Argument in the Parmenides. In this paper I will argue that the answer to this question must be 'no' because the self-predication assumption is still present in the Sophist,.' 1 I Plato's commitment to self-predication in the Sophist emerges in his argu- ment against the view that all Forms combine (252d2-11): if all Forms combined, then Motion would combine with Rest, and as a result Motion itself would rest, and Rest itself would move. And it is impossible that the Form Rest should move or that the Form Motion should rest. The argument has caused bewilderment. Plato says that it is impossible that the Form of Motion should rest. And how can that be? The Form of Motion is a Form, after all, and Forms are supposed to be changeless. So why doesn't Plato say that it is obvious that the Form of Motion is at rest rather than impossible? It might be urged that Plato denies that Motion rests because he has just argued (248c-e) that http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Phronesis Brill

Self-Predication in the Sophist

Heinaman, Robert
Phronesis , Volume 26 (1): 55 – Jan 1, 1981
Download PDF
12 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/brill/self-predication-in-the-sophist-A4YLzGV41U

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1981 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0031-8868
eISSN
1568-5284
DOI
10.1163/156852881X00132
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

55 Self-Predication in the Sophist ROBERT HEINAMAN A major problem in the interpretation of Plato's metaphysics is the question of whether he abandoned self-predication as a result of the Third Man Argument in the Parmenides. In this paper I will argue that the answer to this question must be 'no' because the self-predication assumption is still present in the Sophist,.' 1 I Plato's commitment to self-predication in the Sophist emerges in his argu- ment against the view that all Forms combine (252d2-11): if all Forms combined, then Motion would combine with Rest, and as a result Motion itself would rest, and Rest itself would move. And it is impossible that the Form Rest should move or that the Form Motion should rest. The argument has caused bewilderment. Plato says that it is impossible that the Form of Motion should rest. And how can that be? The Form of Motion is a Form, after all, and Forms are supposed to be changeless. So why doesn't Plato say that it is obvious that the Form of Motion is at rest rather than impossible? It might be urged that Plato denies that Motion rests because he has just argued (248c-e) that

Journal

Phronesis – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 1981

There are no references for this article.