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True and False Names in the "Cratylus"

True and False Names in the "Cratylus" 135 True and False Names in the "Cratylus" MARY RICHARDSON ecent commentators on the Cratylus have typically passed one of the following (equally condemnatory) judgments on the passage 385 B-C, in which Plato asserts that words can be true or false: Plato has given us a patently bad argument, Plato is confused, or Plato does not mean what he says. I think that an examination of the text will vindicate Plato of all of these charges. In this paper I shall attempt to show that the charges are unfounded by arguing that only if one supposes that Plato means by 'logos' in the passage in question something like what contemporary philosophers mean by 'statement' can one advance the arguments used by the aforementioned commen- tators in support of their verdicts, and, further, that it is most un- likely that the text can support such an interpretation. The major burden of this paper will be to try to give a reasonable analysis of the passage in question without imposing on it the contemporary philo- sophical use of the word 'statement'. Let us begin by examining the context in which the passage appears. Cratylus and Hermogenes have been arguing about http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Phronesis Brill

True and False Names in the "Cratylus"

Richardson, Mary
Phronesis , Volume 21 (2): 135 – Jan 1, 1976
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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1976 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0031-8868
eISSN
1568-5284
DOI
10.1163/156852876X00093
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

135 True and False Names in the "Cratylus" MARY RICHARDSON ecent commentators on the Cratylus have typically passed one of the following (equally condemnatory) judgments on the passage 385 B-C, in which Plato asserts that words can be true or false: Plato has given us a patently bad argument, Plato is confused, or Plato does not mean what he says. I think that an examination of the text will vindicate Plato of all of these charges. In this paper I shall attempt to show that the charges are unfounded by arguing that only if one supposes that Plato means by 'logos' in the passage in question something like what contemporary philosophers mean by 'statement' can one advance the arguments used by the aforementioned commen- tators in support of their verdicts, and, further, that it is most un- likely that the text can support such an interpretation. The major burden of this paper will be to try to give a reasonable analysis of the passage in question without imposing on it the contemporary philo- sophical use of the word 'statement'. Let us begin by examining the context in which the passage appears. Cratylus and Hermogenes have been arguing about

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Phronesis – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 1976

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