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Individuals in Aristotle's "Categories": Two Queries

Individuals in Aristotle's "Categories": Two Queries 146 Individuals in Aristotle's "Categories": Two Queries JULIA ANNAS r. Barrington Jones, in his recent article in Phronesis,11 has sugges- ted a new way of solving the standing debate about the nature of non-substance individuals in the Categories. Mr. Jones' article suggests some exciting new approaches to the Categories, but I would like to put forward two difficulties I find with the way he proposes to cut through the main problem. In the Categories, but nowhere else, there seem to be individuals in non-substance categories, corresponding to primary substances. What sort of thing are these non-substance individuals? According to Ackrill2 they are non-repeatable individual instances of (for example) a property. An example would be the particular instance of white exhibited by this paper: it is peculiar to this piece of paper and will perish when it does. According to Owen3 they are the most specific types of (for example) a property. The white exhibited by this piece of paper and all the paper in the same batch would be an example: it can continue to exist when this piece of paper perishes, as long as some other piece of paper from the batch continues to exhibit it. I http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Phronesis Brill

Individuals in Aristotle's "Categories": Two Queries

Annas, Julia
Phronesis , Volume 19 (1-2): 146 – Jan 1, 1974
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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1974 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0031-8868
eISSN
1568-5284
DOI
10.1163/156852874X00167
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

146 Individuals in Aristotle's "Categories": Two Queries JULIA ANNAS r. Barrington Jones, in his recent article in Phronesis,11 has sugges- ted a new way of solving the standing debate about the nature of non-substance individuals in the Categories. Mr. Jones' article suggests some exciting new approaches to the Categories, but I would like to put forward two difficulties I find with the way he proposes to cut through the main problem. In the Categories, but nowhere else, there seem to be individuals in non-substance categories, corresponding to primary substances. What sort of thing are these non-substance individuals? According to Ackrill2 they are non-repeatable individual instances of (for example) a property. An example would be the particular instance of white exhibited by this paper: it is peculiar to this piece of paper and will perish when it does. According to Owen3 they are the most specific types of (for example) a property. The white exhibited by this piece of paper and all the paper in the same batch would be an example: it can continue to exist when this piece of paper perishes, as long as some other piece of paper from the batch continues to exhibit it. I

Journal

Phronesis – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 1974

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