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Aristotle on the Transcendentals

Aristotle on the Transcendentals 225 Aristotle on the Transcendentals MICHAEL J. LOUX n this paper, I want to examine two claims found in Aristotle's Metaphysics : (A) the claim that notions like being and unity do not constitute genera and (B) the claim that such notions are not univocally predicable of all things. I want, in particular, to consider the view (expressed by Porphyry, William of Ockham, and J. L. Ackrill) that (A) entails (B). I shall argue that the alleged entailment cannot hold since while (A) is true, (B) is false. I The claim that neither being nor unity can function generically is discussed in a number of places. The most detailed discussion of the thesis is found in Metabhysics B 3, 998 b 22-27, where Aristotle says :1 But it is not possible that either being (Tb 6v) or unity (ib guv) should be a single genus of things, for the differentiae of any genus must each of them have being and be one (xai elvoct xat clvai) but it is not possible for the genus taken apart from its species (any more than for the species of the genus) to be predicated of the differentiae, so that if unity http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Phronesis Brill

Aristotle on the Transcendentals

Loux, Michael J.
Phronesis , Volume 18 (3): 225 – Jan 1, 1973
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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1973 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0031-8868
eISSN
1568-5284
DOI
10.1163/156852873X00168
Publisher site
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Abstract

225 Aristotle on the Transcendentals MICHAEL J. LOUX n this paper, I want to examine two claims found in Aristotle's Metaphysics : (A) the claim that notions like being and unity do not constitute genera and (B) the claim that such notions are not univocally predicable of all things. I want, in particular, to consider the view (expressed by Porphyry, William of Ockham, and J. L. Ackrill) that (A) entails (B). I shall argue that the alleged entailment cannot hold since while (A) is true, (B) is false. I The claim that neither being nor unity can function generically is discussed in a number of places. The most detailed discussion of the thesis is found in Metabhysics B 3, 998 b 22-27, where Aristotle says :1 But it is not possible that either being (Tb 6v) or unity (ib guv) should be a single genus of things, for the differentiae of any genus must each of them have being and be one (xai elvoct xat clvai) but it is not possible for the genus taken apart from its species (any more than for the species of the genus) to be predicated of the differentiae, so that if unity

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Phronesis – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 1973

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