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False Pleasure and the Philebus

False Pleasure and the Philebus 147 False Pleasure and the Philebus J. DYBIKOWSKI he philosophical suggestiveness of Plato's discussion of false pleasure has been noted in some contemporary analyses of the concept of pleasure.' But the interpretation of Plato's account of how it is that these pleasures are false is still in doubt. J. C. Gosling and A. Kenny have debated this issue, centering their attention on the passage extending from 35 c to 41 b.2 2 In this paper I attempt to isolate an issue on which the debate has been inconclusive and move on from there to make some further suggestions for the interpretation of this controversial passage. What I shall argue is that Plato does indeed make a mistake in his defence of the concept of false pleasure. But it will be my further claim that the mistake is not such a con- sequential one because the concept can be defended on other grounds. And, finally, I shall maintain that the concept is not only of con- siderable importance to the philosophy of mind owing to the analysis of pleasure which grounds it, but that it is of importance to moral philosophy as well and of greater importance than Plato http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Phronesis Brill

False Pleasure and the Philebus

Phronesis , Volume 15 (1-2): 147 – Jan 1, 1970

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1970 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0031-8868
eISSN
1568-5284
DOI
10.1163/156852870X00116
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

147 False Pleasure and the Philebus J. DYBIKOWSKI he philosophical suggestiveness of Plato's discussion of false pleasure has been noted in some contemporary analyses of the concept of pleasure.' But the interpretation of Plato's account of how it is that these pleasures are false is still in doubt. J. C. Gosling and A. Kenny have debated this issue, centering their attention on the passage extending from 35 c to 41 b.2 2 In this paper I attempt to isolate an issue on which the debate has been inconclusive and move on from there to make some further suggestions for the interpretation of this controversial passage. What I shall argue is that Plato does indeed make a mistake in his defence of the concept of false pleasure. But it will be my further claim that the mistake is not such a con- sequential one because the concept can be defended on other grounds. And, finally, I shall maintain that the concept is not only of con- siderable importance to the philosophy of mind owing to the analysis of pleasure which grounds it, but that it is of importance to moral philosophy as well and of greater importance than Plato

Journal

PhronesisBrill

Published: Jan 1, 1970

There are no references for this article.