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Philebus, 35a6-10

Philebus, 35a6-10 31 Philebus, 35a6-10 J. M. LEE ITPQ. K«1 ome commentatorsl have found difficulty in accommodating this passage to the general line of argument from 34e3 to 35d4, which is that desire, since it consists in the soul's remembering past replenishment, must be non-bodily. Why should Plato, already having indicated at 34e9-12 that desire is felt only when organic depletion is going on, clutter up the argument with an apparently irrelevant digression about the first occasion of depletion? One possibility2 is that the first occasion of depletion is a special case of desire, upon which the argument from 35 a6 to 35c2 is based. (The references at 35 b 1 to o Enc6u?,WV and at b 6 to 6 would thus be references to o To <re<.ùe;; EcpohrTeaQon Xotjrov, ryj (sc. 8?aov Attempts have been made to explain away this inconsistency. Should we not read y6crewq' instead of 7tÀ1)p6><re<.ùe;;' as the genitive implied on at c 1? Not, surely, without convicting Plato of 'an incredible negligence of expression',4 and disregarding the fact that 'there is no allusion in this context'5 to original organic equilibrium. A second 32 explanations has it that there is, in an equivocation, the argument presupposing http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Phronesis Brill

Philebus, 35a6-10

Phronesis , Volume 11 (1): 31 – Jan 1, 1966

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1966 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0031-8868
eISSN
1568-5284
DOI
10.1163/156852866X00111
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

31 Philebus, 35a6-10 J. M. LEE ITPQ. K«1 ome commentatorsl have found difficulty in accommodating this passage to the general line of argument from 34e3 to 35d4, which is that desire, since it consists in the soul's remembering past replenishment, must be non-bodily. Why should Plato, already having indicated at 34e9-12 that desire is felt only when organic depletion is going on, clutter up the argument with an apparently irrelevant digression about the first occasion of depletion? One possibility2 is that the first occasion of depletion is a special case of desire, upon which the argument from 35 a6 to 35c2 is based. (The references at 35 b 1 to o Enc6u?,WV and at b 6 to 6 would thus be references to o To <re<.ùe;; EcpohrTeaQon Xotjrov, ryj (sc. 8?aov Attempts have been made to explain away this inconsistency. Should we not read y6crewq' instead of 7tÀ1)p6><re<.ùe;;' as the genitive implied on at c 1? Not, surely, without convicting Plato of 'an incredible negligence of expression',4 and disregarding the fact that 'there is no allusion in this context'5 to original organic equilibrium. A second 32 explanations has it that there is, in an equivocation, the argument presupposing

Journal

PhronesisBrill

Published: Jan 1, 1966

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