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50 The 'Third Man' Argument and Plato's Theory of Forms1 J. M. E. MORAVCSIK HE 'Third Man'-argument (Parmenides I32aI-b2) is one of the most controversial passages in Plato's dialogues. In recent years a number of new interpretations of this argument have appeared.2 These interpretations were designed to bring to bear upon the Platonic text the logical rigour and analytic acumen which are characteristic of con- temporary philosophy. Allegedly implicit premisses have been brought to light with the help of symbolic logic, and attempts have been made to relate the argument to the problem of change vs. constancy in Plato's metaphysical position. Though these interpretations contain much that is stimulating, each of them seems to have the shortcoming of re- presenting Plato as fairly simple-minded philosophically, 3 and of locating the complexity of thought in logical structure.4 Such accounts ascribe to Plato the kind of argument which is not typical of what we encounter in the dialogues. For in most of his writings Plato emphasizes philosophical depth, rather than formal complexity. Thus it is more plausible to suppose that the passage under consideration is fairly simple in its deductive form, and that it poses problems with serious metaphysical implications.
Phronesis – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 1963
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