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115 Forms as Standards R. S. BLUCK LATO called his Forms and he is taken to mean that P they were patterns or standards of which objects and acts in the sensible world are copies. But in what sense were they 'standards' ? My purpose is to offer a few remarks on this question. Wittgenstein once suggested to me 1 that a Form may be to its homonymous instances as the Standard Pound is to a pound weight in a shop. This interesting analogy brings out clearly the fact that a Form was not merely what we mean by an attribute, nor merely what we under- stand by a universal. It also illustrates the way in which a Form gives to particulars the right to be called after itself, and something of the substantiality, durability and perfection of a Form. Like most analogies, of course, it must not be pressed too far. But if certain points are kept clearly in mind, the suggestion is a valuable one. In particular, it must be borne in mind that a Form is essentially voqT6v and not and that this makes it a rather special kind of 'standard'. In seeking to establish
Phronesis – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 1957
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