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“Predication, Things, and Kinds in Aristotle’s Metaphysics”

“Predication, Things, and Kinds in Aristotle’s Metaphysics” <jats:sec><jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>What in Aristotle corresponds, in whole or (more likely) in part, to our contemporary notion of predication? This paper sketches counterparts in Aristotle’s text to our theories of expression and of truth, and on this basis inquires into his treatment of sentences assigning an individual to its kinds. In some recent accounts, the <jats:italic>Metaphysics</jats:italic> offers a fresh look at such sentences in terms of matter and form, in contrast to the simpler theory on offer in the <jats:italic>Categories</jats:italic>. I argue that the <jats:italic>Metaphysics</jats:italic> initiates no change in this regard over the <jats:italic>Categories</jats:italic>. The point that form is (metaphysically) predicated of matter is a contribution, not to the account of statement predication, but to the analysis of compound material substances. Otherwise put, in our terms Aristotelian form is not - in particular, is not <jats:italic>also</jats:italic> - a propositional function, but a function from matter to compound material substances.</jats:p> </jats:sec> http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Phronesis Brill

“Predication, Things, and Kinds in Aristotle’s Metaphysics”

Phronesis , Volume 56 (4): 350 – Jan 1, 2011

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 2011 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0031-8868
eISSN
1568-5284
DOI
10.1163/156852811X588697
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

<jats:sec><jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>What in Aristotle corresponds, in whole or (more likely) in part, to our contemporary notion of predication? This paper sketches counterparts in Aristotle’s text to our theories of expression and of truth, and on this basis inquires into his treatment of sentences assigning an individual to its kinds. In some recent accounts, the <jats:italic>Metaphysics</jats:italic> offers a fresh look at such sentences in terms of matter and form, in contrast to the simpler theory on offer in the <jats:italic>Categories</jats:italic>. I argue that the <jats:italic>Metaphysics</jats:italic> initiates no change in this regard over the <jats:italic>Categories</jats:italic>. The point that form is (metaphysically) predicated of matter is a contribution, not to the account of statement predication, but to the analysis of compound material substances. Otherwise put, in our terms Aristotelian form is not - in particular, is not <jats:italic>also</jats:italic> - a propositional function, but a function from matter to compound material substances.</jats:p> </jats:sec>

Journal

PhronesisBrill

Published: Jan 1, 2011

Keywords: truth; kinds; predication; forms; Aristotle; functions

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