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Volume III

Volume III The Study of Time Volume III Proceedings of the Third Conference of the International Society for the Study of Time, Alpbach, Austria R. S. Brumbaugh Metaphysical Presuppositions and the Study of Time It has been assumed in past discussions of Time that the subject of inquiry is enough like a Želd or a substance so that the law of contradiction must apply to it in the same way. It would then follow that if in some context time neces- sarily has the property P, there is no context in which it can have the property Not-P. This is a very strong metaphysical assumption. In fact, in different con- texts, time is observed and deŽned as having essential properties that are mutu- ally contradictory. In the past, this has been assumed to be the result of someone’s errors in observation in one or another of the cases. In fact, however, four alter- native accounts are equally persuasive on the level of logical coherence, that of pragmatic effectiveness, and that of aesthetic intuitive evidence. My thesis in the present paper is that there is no error in observation or formulation, but that there has been an error in allowing the http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Kronoscope Brill

Volume III

Kronoscope , Volume 3 (2): 279 – Jan 1, 2003

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 2003 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1567-715x
eISSN
1568-5241
DOI
10.1163/156852403322849332
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The Study of Time Volume III Proceedings of the Third Conference of the International Society for the Study of Time, Alpbach, Austria R. S. Brumbaugh Metaphysical Presuppositions and the Study of Time It has been assumed in past discussions of Time that the subject of inquiry is enough like a Želd or a substance so that the law of contradiction must apply to it in the same way. It would then follow that if in some context time neces- sarily has the property P, there is no context in which it can have the property Not-P. This is a very strong metaphysical assumption. In fact, in different con- texts, time is observed and deŽned as having essential properties that are mutu- ally contradictory. In the past, this has been assumed to be the result of someone’s errors in observation in one or another of the cases. In fact, however, four alter- native accounts are equally persuasive on the level of logical coherence, that of pragmatic effectiveness, and that of aesthetic intuitive evidence. My thesis in the present paper is that there is no error in observation or formulation, but that there has been an error in allowing the

Journal

KronoscopeBrill

Published: Jan 1, 2003

There are no references for this article.