Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.
The Study of Time Volume III Proceedings of the Third Conference of the International Society for the Study of Time, Alpbach, Austria R. S. Brumbaugh Metaphysical Presuppositions and the Study of Time It has been assumed in past discussions of Time that the subject of inquiry is enough like a eld or a substance so that the law of contradiction must apply to it in the same way. It would then follow that if in some context time neces- sarily has the property P, there is no context in which it can have the property Not-P. This is a very strong metaphysical assumption. In fact, in different con- texts, time is observed and dened as having essential properties that are mutu- ally contradictory. In the past, this has been assumed to be the result of someone’s errors in observation in one or another of the cases. In fact, however, four alter- native accounts are equally persuasive on the level of logical coherence, that of pragmatic effectiveness, and that of aesthetic intuitive evidence. My thesis in the present paper is that there is no error in observation or formulation, but that there has been an error in allowing the
Kronoscope – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 2003
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.