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<jats:sec><jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>The publication of memoirs by most of the central participants in negotiations leading to the 1993 Israeli-PLO Oslo accord presents an opportunity to reassess their motives for entering the negotiation process and their reasons for electing to keep the talks secret. Among other insights, the first-hand accounts provide empirical evidence of "two-level games" during the negotiations. The article highlights the utility of Robert Putnam's concepts in understanding the negotiations in Oslo and to the failure to implement final-status talks as envisioned in the accord.</jats:p> </jats:sec>
International Negotiation – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 2008
Keywords: TWO-LEVEL GAMES; SECRECY; BARGAINING; OSLO ACCORD; ISRAEL; NEGOTIATION; WIN-SET; PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)
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