Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/brill/truth-and-contradiction-in-aristotle-s-de-interpretatione-6-9-H5ZVXlqnyf
References (17)
-
Aristotle, C. Kirwan (1971)
Aristotle's Metaphysics, Books Γ, Δ, and Ε -
In writing this essay, I have benefitted greatly from conversations with and comments from many people, among whom the following stand out -
If in different respects, then ‘Man is white’ and ‘Man is not white’ do not constitute a genuine contradictory pair. -
William Ockham, M. Adams, N. Kretzmann (1969)
Predestination, God's foreknowledge, and future contingents -
M. Cresswell (2008)
Does every proposition have a unique contradictoryAnalysis, 68
-
If man is white and not white in the same respect, then the law of non-contradiction is violated. -
For all x , if x is a future particular statement, then there is some y such that ( x , y ) constitutes a future particular contradictory pair. (assumption of SC with respect to future particulars -
Blake Hestir (2006)
Aristotle on TruthInternational Philosophical Quarterly, 46
-
Earlier versions of parts of section 3 were presented at the 2008 Central Division Meeting of the -
R. Thomason (2008)
Indeterminist time and truth‐value gaps1Theoria, 36
-
Michael White (1981)
Fatalism and Causal Determinism: An Aristotelian EssayThe Philosophical Quarterly, 31
-
Susanne Bobzien (2007)
Aristotle's De Interpretatione 8 is About Ambiguity -
C. Taylor, C. Kirwan (1973)
Aristotle's Metaphysics BooksThe Philosophical Quarterly, 23
-
Aristotle, J. Ackrill (1975)
Aristotle's Categories and de Interpretatione -
For all x and all y such that x and y constitute a future particular contradictory pair ( x , y ): (i) x is either true or false; and (ii) if x is true, y is false; and (iii) if x is false, y is true -
R. Keefe (2000)
Theories of vagueness -
Christos Panayides (1999)
Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic
- Publisher
- Brill
- Copyright
- © 2010 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
- ISSN
- 0031-8868
- eISSN
- 1568-5284
- DOI
- 10.1163/003188610X12589452898804
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
<jats:sec><jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>In De Interpretatione 6-9, Aristotle considers three logical principles: the principle of bivalence, the law of excluded middle, and the rule of contradictory pairs (according to which of any contradictory pair of statements, exactly one is true and the other false). Surprisingly, Aristotle accepts none of these without qualification. I offer a coherent interpretation of these chapters as a whole, while focusing special attention on two sorts of statements that are of particular interest to Aristotle: universal statements not made universally and future particular statements. With respect to the former, I argue that Aristotle takes them to be indeterminate and so to violate the rule of contradictory pairs. With respect to the latter, the subject of the much discussed ninth chapter, I argue that the rule of contradictory pairs, and not the principle of bivalence, is the focus of Aristotle’s refutation. Nevertheless, Aristotle rejects bivalence for future particular statements.</jats:p> </jats:sec>
Journal
Phronesis – Brill
Published: Jan 1, 2010
Keywords: bivalence; falsehood; truth; De Interpretatione; contradiction